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Though Donald Trump will enter the White House facing both a Republican controlled House and
Senate, Congress is unlikely to be a rubber stamp on his legislative agenda. Traditionally,
presidents use the threat of legislative veto to move policy closer to their own preferences, but these
threats tend to not be credible. In new research, Hans Hassell and Sam Kernell look closely at one
type of veto threat – those made to resist extra legislation and spending on annual spending bills.
He finds that such threats to veto riders can influence legislation by encouraging bipartisanship in
the legislative process, especially in the Senate.
At the start of the 114th Congress in 2015, President Obama encouraged Republican leaders in the
Senate to work together with him to achieve common ground recognizing that while there were
many things on which they disagreed, there were also many opportunities for collaboration. Yet, on
the very same day that President Obama had talked about working together with his political
opponents, the president had also threatened to veto two bills introduced and reported by House
committees. Five days later he threatened three more on his way to a total of eight veto threats in
the first month of a congressional session — the most by any president since veto threats began to
be formally recorded in 1985. As of early November 2016, President Obama had threatened to veto 59 different bills
in the second session of the 114th Congress alone. Though president-elect Donald Trump will enter the White House
with both the House of Representatives and the Senate on his side, it may not be entirely smooth sailing for his
agenda; presidential vetoes have not been unknown during periods of unified government.
The use of such threats is not unprecedented and presidents have regularly threatened bills they find lacking or
undesirable. Yet, presidents, contemplating the use of such threats, would find prevailing political science theory
about their effectiveness discouraging. While presidents might want to utilize veto threats to move policy closer to
their own preferences, the traditional view of veto threats is that they are minimally effective because threats are
either non-credible and thereby, can only minimally influence legislators, or alternatively, that they are highly
credible, allowing legislators to pinpoint the president’s minimally acceptable policy. This ineffectiveness should be
especially true for threats directed at riders to appropriations bills, extraneous legislation and spending restrictions
attached to “must have” annual spending bills.
In spite of this negative view of the effectiveness of veto threats to resist riders, presidents have increasingly
threatened to veto appropriations bills because of these riders. Table 1 shows the number of riders to appropriations
bills threatened by presidents. Using 989 threatened and unthreatened riders to annual appropriations, Sam Kernell
and I examine the effectiveness of veto threats at removing these objectionable provisions and moving legislation
closer to the president’s preferences.
Table 1 – The Distribution of SAP-Threatened Riders across Congresses
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Threatened Riders
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Congress Presidency House (Seat
%)
Senate
(Seat %)
# of Threatened
Riders
HAC HF SAC SF
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99th (1985-
1986)
Republican Democrat
(58.2%)
Republican
(56%)
1 0 0 1 0
100th (1987-
1988)
Republican Democrat
(59.3%)
Democrat
(55%)
12 6 3 1 2
101st (1989-
1990)
Republican Democrat
(59.8%)
Democrat
(55%)
8 7 0 1 1
102nd (1991-
1992)
Republican Democrat
(61.6%)
Democrat
(56%)
16 12 0 2 2
103rd (1993-
1994)
Democrat Democrat
(61.4%)
Democrat
(57%)
0 0 0 0 0
104th (1995-
1996)
Democrat Republican
(53.1%)
Republican
(52%)
37 28 2 7 0
105th (1997-
1998)
Democrat Republican
(52.4%)
Republican
(55%)
30 27 1 3 0
106th (1999-
2000)
Democrat Republican
(51.5%)
Republican
(55%)
34 34 0 0 0
107th (2001-
2002)
Republican Republican
(50.8%)
Democrat
(50%)
3 3 0 0 0
108th (2003-
2004)
Republican Republican
(52.6%)
Republican
(51%)
40 30 0 0 10
109th (2005-
2006)
Republican Republican
(53.3%)
Republican
(55%)
26 26 0 0 0
110th (2007-
2008)
Republican Democrat
(53.6%)
Democrat
(50.5%)
54 51 0 0 3
 Party Control of  
Threatened Riders
Origin
Unlike conventional models of veto threats as minimally effective efforts to influence legislation, our findings depict
presidents’ veto rhetoric as an integral feature of a bargaining game between opposing party teams seeking to
coordinate on policy. Because the president is part of a party team, timely, credible veto threats prompt legislators to
reassess which legislative bundles stand the best chance of achieving their policy goals. With veto threats,
presidents also send strong signals identifying for both the public and co-partisans in Congress those policies on
which the parties disagree.
Presidential veto threats influence legislation by solidifying partisan preferences and encouraging partisan
teamwork through the legislative process. As should be expected, the effect of veto threats in the legislative process
reflects the institutional differences between the House and Senate. In the House, threats have little to no effect.
Instead, veto threats have a strong effect on the outcomes in the Senate. In the Senate, they increase the likelihood
of filibusters by 14 percent, they increase the use of non-textbook legislative processes by 25 percent, they increase
the likelihood that the Senate will gridlock and be forced to “punt” the bill to conference to gain traction as part of an
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omnibus bill by 19 percent, and they increase the likelihood that the rider will be removed by the Senate by 15
percent. In short, we find that compared to a similar set of unthreatened riders, threatened riders face much larger
hurdles to passage.
Moreover, at the end of the process, veto-threatened riders are less than half as likely to survive to the enrolled bill
stage as are unthreatened riders. As Figure 1 below shows, overall, the presence of a veto threat increases the
likelihood that a rider will be removed prior to final passage of the bill from 18 percent to 58 percent.
Figure 1 – Likelihood of Conference excluding HAC riders across different Senate actions and veto
threatened status*
Probabilities are simulation estimates from Model 1 in Table 4 in paper including controls.  All
differences are significant at the p<.05 level.
Our results show that presidential veto threats are not just cheap talk, but rather are an integral part of the process
that allows legislators to identify critical areas of legislation that must be resolved in order to avoid gridlock and pass
annual appropriation. With veto threats chalking up such success, and with presidents increasingly enlisting them to
counter objectionable legislation, veto threats appear to carve out a crucial role for presidents in the legislative
process.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Veto Rhetoric and Legislative Riders’ in the American Journal of Political Science.
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Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor
the London School of Economics.
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